In keeping with the theme that The Bald Men do the most intriguing things tactically, Eric Chelle’s bow as Nigeria head coach began on Friday left us with a lot to pore over.
While the fact of the win has been celebrated for its broader significance, it was the manner of it and the window that provided into the Malian’s thinking that most captured the imagination. Having initially planned to wait and do one big piece after the conclusion of the Zimbabwe match on Tuesday, I have instead opted to turn this newsletter into something of an ongoing archive of observations, to the end that nothing may go unremarked.
The shape
While in charge of Mali, it was Chelle’s choice of a midfield diamond that first caught the eye. Having a limited sample size in terms of his managerial experience to go on, it was easy to assume that the decision to implement such an unorthodox idea was down to the Eagles’ preponderance of talent in the centre of the pitch. Nigeria, whose squad composition for so long seemed to completely neglect that area and whose strengths (quantitatively and qualitatively) lay elsewhere, would no doubt provide a clearer idea of his ideological attachment to that structure.
On the evidence of Friday’s ructions in Kigali, it is now safe to say that the midfield diamond is the 47-year-old’s true north, as it were. No one installs such a peculiar shape on the strength of roughly three full training sessions unless they simply cannot interpret the game outside of it, and so determined was Chelle to implement it right off the bat that he made some odd selection choices to get there.
However, before we delve into the personnel…
What exactly is a “midfield diamond”?
Notation in football tactics can be tricky due to the dynamic nature of the sport. A lot of coaches do not like the oversimplification of their work in that fashion, but it is a necessary means by which the layman may parse their intent and organisation, even within such fluid interconnectivity.
To explain it, here I will quote the website Coaches’ Voice.
“The midfield unit creates a diamond, with a single pivot at the base, two number eights on the outside of the midfield four, and a number 10 at the tip of the diamond.”
When used in conjunction with a back four and two centre-forwards, as Chelle prefers, you have what is known colloquially as a 4-4-2 diamond.
The 4-4-2 diamond, like any other structure, has a number of advantages to it, but perhaps the chiefest of them is the ability to utterly dominate the midfield zone, both with and without the ball. With four players in the middle of the pitch, in the correct organisation and with the right intensity, opponent access through the centre is close to impossible. There really are only two ways to consistently create danger against it.
However, finding players with the necessary profiles and application to play in that shape effectively, i.e. in a way that not only activates its strengths but also mitigates its weaknesses, is no simple feat. There is a reason not many managers use a 4-4-2 diamond: ideally, you need
Highly energetic, universal number eights to shift across the pitch out of possession. They must also be competent in and out of possession in every third, both with and without the ball, able to attack and defend. They are, by far, the linchpins of this structure.
Two centre-forwards able to aggressively run the channels and fan across the width of the pitch (as the structure does not incorporate natural wingers), away from their comfort zone. This requires a giving disposition, but also high levels of explosive athleticism.
A visionary number ten who is able to make decisions quickly in possession, and who may be required to also attack the space vacated by one or both centre-forwards when they are in wide areas.
Centre-backs who are strong in the air and positionally exemplary. Depending on how much width the full-backs are tasked to provide in settled possession/attacking phases, the centre-backs may also need to be comfortable defending 1v1 in wide areas
A defensive midfielder who is able to cover significant ground, but who is also adept at both distribution and dismarking
It was for precisely this reason that I half-expected, if not a total departure from Chelle, at least a gentle easing-in.
Instead, he dove in headfirst.
The personnel & what it tells us
Let us examine the selection choices the Malian made to arrive at this structure, as well as make some observations as to how he animated it.
The back four picked itself for the most part, with the major surprise being the dropping of Bruno Onyemaechi for Bright Osayi-Samuel.
It was in midfield that things got interesting.
Wilfred Ndidi and Alex Iwobi were easy enough to see coming – the Leicester man may not be the most comfortable fit in possession, but he is more tenacious in the tackle than Raphael Onyedika, so using him as the sole pivot made sense from an off-the-ball perspective. Iwobi is tailor-made for one of the number eight roles, even though, at a pinch you could see him in the number ten as well.
For the other number eight role, however, Chelle strangely opted for Samuel Chukwueze, an inconsistent winger at the best of times who in no way fit the mold. In the hole behind the two strikers, Ademola Lookman got the nod.
Victor Osimhen upfront was a dead cert regardless of the coach’s ideas; HEIS, after all, Nigeria’s premier centre-forward and (after Friday’s proceedings) the country’s second highest-ever goalscorer. However, it also helped that he is the right profile: a selfless, frothing bottle of undiluted piss and vinegar.
Alongside him upfront was Moses Simon, a winger selected to start out of position in spite of the fact the bench featured all of Umar Sadiq, Victor Boniface and Tolu Arokodare. This was not, however, some galaxy brain idea, neither was it simply about shoehorning: it was a decision made purely with a view to the demands of the structure: Osimhen aside, the Super Eagles really lack that energetic, selfless runner profile.
Both Sadiq and Arokodare are target men, and Boniface is something of a 9.5 who drifts into deeper/wider areas, not to stretch defences necessarily, but to create overloads and play combinations.
Enter Simon who, though not a centre-forward, possesses the skill set required for the role, and largely fulfilled it well. (It is a shame that Nathan Tella, who has been used as a winger-striker hybrid to good effect on a number of occasions at Bayer Leverkusen, was unavailable for these matches.)
This tells us something: that Chelle understands well the imperatives of his structure, and is more committed to fit than nominal positions. It also suggests that, at least within this framework, that none of three benched strikers is likely to start very often.
What does Chukwueze in midfield tell us, though?
That one is tougher to make sense of, and nothing about his performance offered up any clues as to what the thinking was. It has been interpreted in some quarters as more psychological warfare than anything else: a vehicle for a shock-and-awe strategy aimed at overwhelming what was, objectively, inferior opposition. Others have praised his willingness to get around the pitch, and while I do not question that, against a side like Rwanda, some quality on the ball would have been nice to boot.
Instead, I think this was simply a case of having no neat fit for that role. A player like Fisayo Dele-Bashiru would have been interesting to see there; he is not made-to-order necessarily, but he at least has some experience of playing in midfield and is excellent at making runs into the attack.
Notes & observations
As Osimhen revealed in his Obi One podcast appearance, Chelle is really keen on pressing and application without the ball. Nigeria were extremely aggressive high up the pitch, and turned the ball over copiously in the first 25-30 minutes of the match by funneling their hosts into the middle of the pitch and trapping them. There were teething pains in terms of gauging distances and timing jumps, however, which were compensated for with energy until that began to wane and Rwanda grew into the game a bit more in the latter portion of the half.
Upon winning the ball back, however, the Super Eagles often struggled with the transition into attack. Again, the spacing was to blame here: Chelle’s side typically won the ball back in situations where the midfield four were very close together, requiring quick combinations to work the ball forward. The frenzied tempo and lack of familiarity with the distances led to coughing up the ball a lot when trying to break.
When Nigeria were in possession, both full-backs were quite conservative. Osayi-Samuel got forward a bit more, probably because, unlike Aina, he was on his stronger side but, on the whole, both largely held their positions. It appears this is a hallmark of Chelle’s interpretation of the structure: while at Mali, his full-backs also tended to mind the shop primarily, contrary to what one might expect with a 4-4-2 diamond. (Interestingly, Falaye Sacko also featured prominently as a right-footed left-back.)
Of the number eights, Chukwueze was, unsurprisingly, the more attacking in his movements. Iwobi played a little closer to Ndidi, and Lookman drifted a bit more left-of-centre.
The biggest weakness of the diamond midfield is, of course, its lack of defensive coverage in wide areas. It is a trade-off for dominating the centre, but it means that opponents can create wide overloads and prosper that way, or switch quickly to the weak side to create havoc. Rwanda seemed to work this out as time went on, and began to put Nigeria on the back foot a bit. However…
…the danger of committing full-backs high up to overload and exploit that defensive weakness in wide areas is that it leaves your centre-backs isolated against the centre-forwards. Against a striker like Osimhen, that is akin to suicide, and the Super Eagles’ second was a direct consequence of this. Few defenders will relish the idea of a foot race with the Galatasaray man, and the Rwandan defender duly panicked, lunging in. That did not end well.
In the second half, the introductions of, first, Onyedika and later Arokodare, saw Nigeria trial two more shapes, albeit briefly. First Simon went to the right and the team lined up in a 4-3-3, and then, when the giant from Genk entered the fray, we saw a glimpse of a 4-2-3-1, with the focus more on retaining possession and seeing the game out. This suggests that, while Chelle is wedded to the diamond as a first resort, it need not be the last, and that he is well aware there is a less unwieldy way to use some of the talent available to him.
It was interesting how much threat the Super Eagles carried on set-pieces. This was clearly something worked on: when seeking to drill a new, unusual organisation, especially in such a short space of time, having an easy route to create chances that exists outside of it is key.
Zimbabwe will tell us more, as will the international break in June, when at least one friendly is in the offing.
Would love to see the diamond with Dele-Bashiru as the 10, Lookman up top, Ndidi as one of the 8s, Onyedika at the base
I really love the analysis